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TAXATION OF HOUSEHOLDS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
JOEL S. NEWMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Some of us live alone, but most live in groups.  Those of us who live in 
groups usually pool our income and expenses, somehow.1  In crafting an 
income tax, one must determine whether or not to take such pooling into 
account.2  Either way, some living arrangements will be tax-advantaged, and 
others will be tax-penalized.3 
Neither taking pooling into account nor ignoring it is necessarily fair.  
Furthermore, neither choice is simple.  If pooling is taken into account, one 
must determine which groups should be recognized and when.4  Also, should 
there be one aggregate group tax return, or should income and expenses be 
reallocated to group members? 
 
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. 
 1. “We believe firmly that the family is today, as it has been for many centuries, the basic 
economic unit in society.”  3 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON TAXATION, TAXATION OF 
INCOME, PART A: TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES 123 (Reprt. 1968).  “When it is 
asked whether one taxpayer is in the same situation as another, is the taxpayer an individual or a 
family?  The sharing of both consumption and wealth within families supports continuation of 
present law in regarding the family as the unit of comparison.”  DAVID F. BRADFORD & THE U.S. 
TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 25 (2d rev. ed. 1984).  See 
PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 594–96 
(Pocket Books 1985) (1983) (providing data on various cohabitation arrangements); Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax 
Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 73 (1993) (discussing income pooling in contexts other than 
marriage); Michael Young, Distribution of Income within the Family, 3 BRIT. J. SOC. 305, 310–
11 (1952) (providing data on income distribution and expenditure in various family situations). 
 2. These issues transcend tax policy; they also impact welfare (especially relating to 
subsidies for child care), retirement, and health care policies.  This Article, however, will stick to 
tax. 
 3. Many of us would begin with a presumption that taxation should be neutral among 
varied lifestyle choices.  Some of us would stop there.  Others would go on and consider rebutting 
that presumption, if a strong enough case could be made in societal terms for encouraging one 
lifestyle choice or another.  Unfortunately, it is impossible for taxation to be totally neutral among 
lifestyle choices.  Therefore, realistically, the issue becomes whether we should try to minimize 
the influence of taxation on lifestyle choices, or whether we should determine which lifestyle 
choice we favor and then use taxation to encourage it. 
 4. See infra Part II.A. 
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If pooling is not taken into account, then different groups will be taxed 
differently on the same aggregate income, depending upon who earns the 
income within the group.5  One must also determine which “intra-group” 
transfers will be recognized and which will be finessed.  For example, do we 
tax Junior on the cost of his breakfast? 
Different countries have made different choices at different times.6  
Structurally, the choices fall into two categories: individual taxation and group 
taxation.  Within the category of individual taxation, some countries rigorously 
tax individuals.7  Others tax individuals on earned income, but tax other 
income differently.8  Within the category of group taxation, some countries 
aggregate all household income to be taxed to one family member.9  Others 
 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
 6. For a comparative perspective on the income taxation of households, see generally 
HUGH J. AULT ET AL., COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (3d ed. 
2010) (laying out taxation structures and principles in a variety of nations); 57a 26TH INT’L 
CONGRESS OF FIN. & TAX LAW, STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAW: THE INCOME, 
FORTUNE AND ESTATE TAX TREATMENT OF HOUSEHOLD UNITS 4–5 (Int’l Fiscal Ass’n [I.F.A.] 
1972) (providing taxation data for a variety of nations); K.C. MESSERE, TAX POLICY IN OECD 
COUNTRIES: CHOICES AND CONFLICTS (1993) (comparing tax structures and reforms across 
nations); Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of 
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1972) (examining how the I.R.C. 
discriminates against duel wage earner families, disincentivizing work for women); Norma 
Briggs, Individual Income Taxation and Social Benefits in Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 
U.S.A., 39 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 243 (1985) (analyzing how tax systems in 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States affect women); Oliver Oldman & Ralph 
Temple, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons, 12 STAN. L. REV. 585, 586 
(1959–1960) (analyzing taxation of married couples in various nations); Henry Ordower, 
Commentary, Comparative Law Observations on Taxation of Same-Sex Couples, 111 TAX NOTES 
229 (2006) (noting developments in various countries regarding same-sex unions and listing 
relevant statutes and court decisions); Joseph A. Pechman & Gary V. Engelhardt, The Income Tax 
Treatment of the Family: An International Perspective, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 1, 12, 13 (1990) 
(analyzing income tax treatment of families in developed nations); Janet Stotsky, Gender Bias in 
Tax Systems, 14 INT’L TAX NOTES 1913 (1997) (examining gender bias in taxation structures in 
developed and developing nations).   For a broader perspective on the policy treatment of family 
units, see generally GÖRAN THERBORN, BETWEEN SEX AND POWER: FAMILY IN THE WORLD, 
1900–2000 (2004) (documenting the evolution of the family unit during the twentieth century); 
Nancy E. Dowd, Envisioning Work and Family: A Critical Perspective on International Models, 
26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311 (1989) (analyzing how other nations have drafted social policy to 
eliminate conflicts between work and family and proposing how to apply those models in the 
United States); Ann Shola Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative 
Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 303 (1993) (analyzing the 
gender content of social provision). 
 7. See infra Appendix, Table 3. 
 8. See infra Appendix, Table 4. 
 9. See infra Appendix, Table 5.  But see REPORT OF ROYAL COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF 
WOMEN IN CANADA 304 (1970) (explaining the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in 
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aggregate household income, but actually tax it as if a percentage was deemed 
earned by various family members.10  Still others allow the taxpayers to elect 
either aggregate or separate taxation.11 
There are other permutations of group taxation.  Some countries split 
income among more than one wife.12  Also, one can tax larger groups.  There 
is the Hindu Undivided Family, which is recognized for tax purposes in India, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.13  
Conceivably, one could tax the aggregate income of a hippie commune14 or 
some other group living arrangement.15 
I.  TWO NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
Two numerical examples are set forth below, one comparing individual 
taxation, aggregate taxation, and the American joint return, and the other 
describing the French foyer fiscal.  These examples show what is at stake, in 
terms of fairness and simplicity.  They also demonstrate which lifestyle 
choices are tax-advantaged and which lifestyle choices are tax-penalized, by 
the various tax structure options. 
 
Canada recommended in 1970 that a husband and wife form a taxation unit with aggregated 
incomes). 
 10. See infra Appendix, Table 6. 
 11. See infra Appendix, Table 7. 
 12. Nigeria and other Muslim countries have recognized multiple wives.  Nigeria, in fact, 
grants a tax preference to the first wife, as opposed to succeeding wives.  Stotsky, supra note 6, at 
1919.  Iraq grants an additional allowance for each of the taxpayer’s wives.  Tax Strategy of 
2004, Al-Waqaeh al-Iraqia [Iraqi Official Gazette] 39 of May 2004 6 (Iraq). 
 13. Income Tax Ordinance 1984 § 5(d) (Bangl.); Income Tax Act, No. 43 of 1961 §2, INDIA 
CODE (1995), available at http://indiacode.nic.in; Income Tax Act (Act No. 53/1967) § 72 
(Malay.); Income Tax Act § 3 (1974) (Myan.); Income Tax Act 1974 § 4 (Nep.); Singapore 
Income Tax Act Part I, § 2 (Sing.); Inland Rev. Act (Act No. 10/2006) § 217(2) (Sri Lanka).  See 
also ACHARYA SHUKLENDRA, HINDU UNDIVIDED FAMILY: TAXATION AND TAX PLANNING 238–
85 (2000) (discussing the principles of the system and how to create such a system and explaining 
that the Hindu Undivided Family has some tax advantages over a partnership); Aurobindo 
Ponniah, Speech at the IBFD: The Hindu Undivided Family, Amsterdam (July 2004); How One 
Can Create HUF (Hindu Undivided Family), SIMPLETAXINDIA.ORG (Jan. 18, 2010), 
http://www.simpletaxindia.org/2008/05/how-one-can-create-hufhindu-undivided.html (describing 
how to arrange capital to be recognized as an HUF). 
 14. See Penelope Green, A Modern Answer to the Commune, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at 
D1 (discussing modern non-familial collective living arrangements). 
 15. Israel allows kibbutzim to file a single tax return.  Income Tax Ordinance, 5737–1967, 1 
LSI 168, 57 (1967) (Isr.).  However, the kibbutz itself functions as a government, taxing its 
members, often progressively, to equalize incomes and to pay for community services.  JO-ANN 
MORT & GARY BRENNER, OUR HEARTS INVENTED A PLACE: CAN KIBBUTZIM SURVIVE IN 
TODAY’S ISRAEL? 75 (2003). 
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A. Individual Taxation, Aggregate Taxation, and the Joint Return 
Imagine a tax regime in which the first $10,000 of income is taxed at 10%, 
income in excess of $10,000 but not over $20,000 is taxed at 20%, and income 
in excess of $20,000 is taxed at 30%.16  Under such a regime, the following 
individual taxpayers would pay tax as set forth in Table 1.17 
Table 1 
Taxpayer Income Tax as Individual
Alex $15,000 $2,000 
Becky $15,000 $2,000 
Charles $0 $0 
Deborah $30,000 $6,000 
Edward $30,000 $6,000 
 
 16. This example is inspired by Boris I. Bittker’s seminal article, Federal Income Taxation 
and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1396–97 (1975).  The other classic article in the field is 
Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and 
Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977) (developing a normative model for 
comprehensive family taxation).  See also CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, THE TAXATION OF 
HUSBAND AND WIFE 5, 12 (1980) (examining the effect of tax provisions relevant to married 
couples in the United Kingdom); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR WORSE: MARRIAGE 
AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1997) (examining how changes to the U.S. labor market have 
affected the impact of tax provisions relating to married couples); EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, 
TAXING WOMEN 14 (1997) (analyzing the impact of tax structures on women); MICHAEL J. 
MCINTYRE & EUGENE C. STEUERLE, THE FINANCE PROJECT, FEDERAL TAX REFORM: A FAMILY 
PERSPECTIVE (1996) (examining three major proposals to alter the taxation of families in the 
United States); WHITE HOUSE WORKING GRP. ON THE FAMILY, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF 
EDUC., THE FAMILY: PRESERVING AMERICA’S FUTURE 43–45 (1986) (recommending updates to 
the Internal Revenue Code to benefit families); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-
175, TAX ADMINISTRATION: INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED AND SINGLE INDIVIDUALS 
(1996) (listing the Internal Revenue Code provisions likely to create marriage “penalties” or 
“bonuses” and estimating the number of citizens affected). 
 17. The computation of both Alex’s and Becky’s tax is: 
 10% of the first $10,000 of income = $1,000 
+ 20% of the last $5,000 of income = $1,000 
Total Tax = $2,000 
 The computation of both Deborah’s and Edward’s tax is: 
 10% of the first $10,000 of income = $1,000 
 20% of the second $10,000 of income = $2,000 
+ 30% of the third $10,000 of income = $3,000 
Total Tax = $6,000 
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Now, imagine that Alex and Becky establish a joint household, and 
Charles and Deborah establish a joint household.  Edward remains single.  If 
all five continue to be taxed as individuals,18 then Alex and Becky will pay an 
aggregate tax of $4,000 on their aggregate income of $30,000,19 while Charles 
and Deborah will pay an aggregate tax of $6,000 on the same aggregate 
income of $30,000.20  Edward, of course, continues to pay $6,000. 
Why should Charles and Deborah pay more tax than Alex and Becky?  If 
households with the same aggregate income should pay the same aggregate 
tax, then either both couples should pay tax of $4,000 or both couples should 
pay tax of $6,000.  The simplest thing is for both households to pay $6,000.  
This result is achieved by consolidating the household income into one return 
and applying the rates.21 
This solution, however, penalizes Alex and Becky.  When they were 
single, each paid taxes of $2,000, for a total of $4,000.  When they become a 
household, however, they pay total taxes of $6,000.  Why should the mere 
status of “household” cause them to pay $2,000 more in tax?  Moreover, 
consider that both couples—Alex and Becky and Charles and Deborah—have 
$30,000 to maintain the lifestyles of two people, while Edward has $30,000 to 
maintain the lifestyle of just one person.  Surely, Edward has more ability to 
pay taxes than either couple.  Shouldn’t he pay more? 
The alternative is to levy a tax of $4,000 on each couple.  This solution is 
achieved by the American joint return.22  In each case, half of the aggregate 
household income of $30,000 is taxed to each spouse, regardless of how it was 
in fact earned.23  Clearly, this solution is unfair to Edward.24  Why is his 
$30,000 of income taxed at $6,000, while the income of the two couples is 
taxed at $4,000?  Further, as to Edward’s purported better ability to pay, he 
will point out that he lacks the economies of scale enjoyed by the two couples.  
Therefore, his ability to pay is not that much better after all. 
As Boris Bittker pointed out decades ago, one can have three goals: 1) 
progressive rates; 2) fairness as between couples and single taxpayers; and 3) 
fairness to couples with the same aggregate income.25  One can achieve two of 
 
 18. See infra Appendix, Table 3 for countries which take this approach. 
 19. $2,000 tax on Alex + $2,000 tax on Becky = $4,000. 
 20. $6,000 tax on Deborah + $0 tax on Charles = $6,000. 
 21. See infra Appendix, Table 5 for countries which take this approach. 
 22. See infra Appendix, Table 6 for countries which take this approach.  For the impact of 
this approach on reporting and liability issues, see Lily Kahng, Innocent Spouses: A Critique of 
the New Tax Laws Governing Joint and Several Tax Liability, 49 VILL. L. REV. 261 (2004). 
 23. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (2006). 
 24. For more on the unfairness to singles, see Katherine D. Black, Mary K. Black, & Julie 
M. Black, The Bias Against Single Parents in the Internal Revenue Code, 126 TAX NOTES 1397 
(2010). 
 25. Bittker, supra note 16, at 1396. 
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the three goals, but never all three.26  So far, it would appear that the simplest 
solution would be to tax only individuals, no matter what.  This solution is the 
most popular.27  The next simplest solution would be to aggregate the income 
of husband and wife, and apply the rates.28  However, both options raise 
fairness issues, as shown above. 
Anything which reallocates income to those who did not in fact earn it 
seems more complex.  The American joint return was discussed above.  The 
French foyer fiscal might be viewed as the American joint return on steroids. 
B. The French Foyer Fiscal 
In the foyer fiscal, each household member receives a share or a fraction of 
a share.29  All household shares are totaled to derive the family coefficient.30  
Aggregate household income then is divided by the family coefficient, to 
determine the income allocated to each share.31  Finally, each household 
member is taxed accordingly.32  Note that, in this system, it does not matter 
which family member actually earned the income. 
Consider the following possibilities: 1) bachelor; 2) childless couple; 3) 
couple with one or two children; 4) single or divorced parent with one or two 
 
 26. Id. at 1396.  One obvious solution is to abolish progressive rates.  However, that debate 
goes beyond the bounds of this inquiry.  See id.  See also Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something 
About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 6 (2000).  For 
discussion of the marriage penalty on the earned income tax credit, see generally Pamela B. 
Gann, The Earned Income Deduction: Congress’s 1981 Response to the “Marriage Penalty” 
Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 468 (1983); Oldman & Temple, supra note 6.  For a discussion of the 
particular impact of the marriage penalty on minorities, see Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and 
Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469 (1997); 
Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. 
L. REV. 751; Mylinh Uy, Comment, Tax and Race: The Impact on Asian Americans, 11 ASIAN L. 
J. 117 (2004). 
 27. See infra Appendix, Table 3. 
 28. See infra Appendix, Table 5. 
 29. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS [C.G.I.] art. 194 (Fr.).  See also Ayla A. Lari, Sharing 
Alike: French Family Taxation as a Model for Reform, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 207, 233 (1999). 
 30. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS, art. 5, 156.  See also Lari, supra note 29, at 232–33. 
 31. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS, art. 193.  See also Lari, supra note 29, at 232–33. 
 32. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS, art. 194.  See also PUB. FIN. GEN. DIRECTORATE & TAX 
POLICY DIRECTORATE, THE FRENCH TAX SYSTEM 28–29 (2009) (explaining the French income 
taxation system in English), available at http://www.impots.gouv.fr/portal/deploiement/p1/fiche 
descriptive_1006/fichedescriptive_1006.pdf; Dowd, supra note 6, at 335; Lari, supra note 29, at 
238.  See generally Louis Kaplow, Optimal Distribution and the Family, 98 SCANDINAVIAN J. 
ECON. 75, 77–87 (1996) (analyzing various family taxation models utilizing household shares).  
There are caps expressed in Euros for tax advantages for larger families.  A similar taxation 
scheme was considered in the United Kingdom in 1920.  REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON 
THE INCOME TAX 59 (1920).  See also McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 16, at 1605 (suggesting a 
scheme similar to the foyer fiscal in Table 1). 
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children.33  In each case, assume that the aggregate household income is 
$30,000 and that the tax rates are as before. 
The bachelor has one share, leading to a family coefficient of one.34  The 
entire $30,000 of household income would be allocated to his one share.  Thus, 
he would pay a tax of $6,000. 
For the childless couple, each receives one share.35  Therefore, the family 
coefficient would be two.  The household income of $30,000 divided by two 
allocates $15,000 to each share.  Accordingly, the husband would pay tax on 
$15,000, or $2,000 tax, and the wife would pay the same.  The aggregate 
household tax would be $4,000, just like an American joint return. 
With a father, a mother, and one child, the father receives one share, the 
mother receives one share, and the child receives a one-half share.36  
Therefore, the family coefficient would be two and one-half.  Dividing 
household income of $30,000 by two and one-half, $12,000 of income would 
be allocated to each full share, and $6,000 would be allocated to the one-half 
share.  Accordingly, the father would pay $1,400 tax on $12,000 of income, 
the mother would pay the same, and the child would pay $600 tax on $6,000 of 
income, for an aggregate tax of $3,400. 
With a father, a mother, and two children, the father receives one share, the 
mother receives one share, and each child receives a one-half share.37  The 
family coefficient is three.  The father pays $1,000 tax on $10,000 of income, 
the mother pays the same, and each child pays $500 tax on $5,000 of income, 
for an aggregate tax of $3,000.  The shares of the third and subsequent children 
increase to full shares.38 
For a single or divorced parent with one child, each individual receives a 
full share.39  Thus, the total tax is $4,000, just like an American joint return.  
For a single or divorced parent with two children, the parent and the first child 
receive a full share, and the second child receives a one-half share.40  Thus, the 
parent would pay $1,400 tax on $12,000 of income.  Child #1 would pay the 
same.  Child #2 would pay $600 tax on $6,000 of income, for an aggregate tax 
of $3,400.  The third and subsequent children receive full shares.41 
 
 33. Divorced ex-spouses are treated differently from widowed ex-spouses.  CODE GÉNÉRAL 
DES IMPÔTS, art. 194. 
 34. Id.  See also Lari, supra note 29, at 233. 
 35. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS, art. 194.  See also Lari, supra note 29, at 233. 
 36. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS, art. 194.  See also Lari, supra note 29, at 233. 
 37. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS, art. 194.  See also Lari, supra note 29, at 233. 
 38. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS, art. 194.  See also Lari, supra note 29, at 233. 
 39. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS, art. 194.  See also Lari, supra note 29, at 234. 
 40. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS, art. 194.  See also Lari, supra note 29, at 234. 
 41. CODE GÉNÉRAL DES IMPÔTS, art. 194.  See also Lari, supra note 29, at 234. 
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These results are summarized in Table 2 
 
Single: 
No 
Children 
Couple: 
No 
Children 
Couple: One 
Child 
Couple: Two 
Children 
Single: 
One 
Child 
Single: Two 
Children 
Members Bachelor Man 
Woman 
Man 
Woman 
Child 
Man 
Woman 
Child #1 
Child #2
Adult 
Child 
Adult 
Child #1  
Child #2 
Coefficient 
for Each 
Member 
Bachelor: 
1 
Man: 1
Woman: 1 
Man: 1 
Woman: 1 
Child: ½ 
Man: 1 
Woman: 1 
Child #1:  ½ 
Child #2:  ½ 
Adult: 1 
Child: 1 
Adult: 1 
Child #1:  1 
Child #2:  ½ 
Family 
Coefficient 1 2 2.5 3 2 2.5 
Income/ 
Coefficient $30,000 $15,000 $12,000 $10,000 $15,000 $12,000 
Income for 
Each 
Member 
Bachelor 
$30,000 
Man 
$15,000 
Woman 
$15,000 
Man 
$12,000 
Woman 
$12,000 
Child 
$6,000 
Man 
$10,000 
Woman 
$10,000 
Child #1 
$5,000 
Child #2 
$5,000 
Adult 
$15,000 
Child 
$15,000 
Adult 
$12,000 
Child #1 
$12,000 
Child #2 
$6,000 
TE 
Member 
Bachelor 
$6,000 
Man 
$2,000 
Woman 
$2,000 
Man 
$1,400 
Woman 
$1,400 
Child 
$600 
Man 
$1,000 
Woman 
$1,000 
Child #1 
$500 
Child #2 
$500 
Adult 
$2,000 
Child 
$2,000 
Adult 
$1,400 
Child #1 
$1,400 
Child #2 
$600 
Total Tax $6,000 $4,000 $3,400 $3,000 $4,000 $3,400 
Note that households with the same aggregate income of $30,000 pay taxes 
that range from $3,000 to $6,000, depending upon the size and nature of the 
household.  Clearly, single, childless taxpayers bear the heaviest burden.  
Partners and children lower the family income taxes, sometimes in surprising 
ways. 
II.  COMPONENT FACTORS 
An initial decision must be made whether to tax individuals or groups.  If 
groups are to be taxed, then one must also decide which groups.  Moreover, 
one must decide whether income should be allocated to those who did not earn 
it, or whether expenses should be allocated to those who did not pay them.  
There is no obviously fair way to do it, and a multitude of factors come into 
play.  Each of these factors will be addressed in turn. 
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A. Which Groups Should be Recognized? 
Should taxes reflect the way people actually live, or not?  Some address 
the issue of recognizing groups in those broad terms.42  However, all of us 
have some level of concern regarding the consequences of our decisions.43  
Would recognizing groups help them or hurt them, in tax terms? 
As shown by the numerical examples above, there is no easy answer.  If 
there is only one rate schedule, then aggregating the income of a group will 
usually lead to increased taxation of that group.44  On the other hand, 
reallocating income within a group, as is done in the American joint return and 
the foyer fiscal, will usually lead to lower aggregate taxation of the group.45  If, 
however, there is more than one tax rate—perhaps one for single people and 
one for married people—then all bets are off.  One would need to know more 
about the different rate schedules to know who is tax-favored and who is not. 
1. Heterosexual Couples 
a. Married 
Does marriage deserve special tax treatment?  Arguably, marriage is a 
time-honored institution which strengthens the stability of society.46  
Therefore, it should be encouraged.  Regarding administrative concerns, it is 
easier to define and determine the existence of the formal marriage relationship 
than it is to determine some other group arrangements.47  Therefore, formal 
 
 42. See Lari, supra note 29, at 240–42, 258–59. 
 43. See Christopher T. Nixon, Should Congress Revise the Tax Code to Extend the Same Tax 
Benefits to Same-Sex Couples as are Currently Granted to Married Couples?: An Analysis in 
Light of Horizontal Equity, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 41, 58–62 (1998) (discussing the social and financial 
consequences of taxing cohabitating versus married couples similarly or differently). 
 44. See Michael Keen et al., The “Flat Tax(es)”: Principles and Experience, 15 INT’L TAX 
& PUB. FIN. 712, 713 (2008) (discussing how moving to a flat tax will necessarily change the rate 
of taxation of particular groups). 
 45. See Lari, supra note 29, at 237 (noting that the steep progressivity of taxation in the 
French system is alleviated through larger families). 
 46. See Amy M. Braverman, Healthy, Wealthy, & Wed, U. OF CHI. MAG., Oct. 2003, at 32, 
34–35 (offering statistical arguments that married people are healthier and richer).  David 
Cameron, the leader of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, agrees and feels that 
marriage should be recognized in the tax system.  David Cameron Reflects, Interview by Andrew 
Marr with David Cameron MP, Leader of H.M. Opposition, BBC SUNDAY AM (July 8, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/sunday_am/6281810.stm. 
 47. Formal marriage may be easier to define than some relationships, but that does not make 
it easy to define.  See Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time: 
Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REV. 773, 788–95 (1989) (describing various 
difficulties in ascertaining an individual’s marital status for tax purposes).  Even in the United 
States, notions of family have changed over time.  Courtney G. Joslin, The Evolution of the 
American Family, HUM. RTS., Summer 2009, at 2–4.  See also Anne Garrels, Short Term 
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marriage has certain advantages from a historical and administrative 
perspective. 
b. Unmarried 
Unmarried heterosexual couples presumably pool income and expenses in 
the same variety of ways that married couples do.  Therefore, if taxation should 
follow the money, then married and unmarried couples should be treated the 
same.48  Some, however, would argue that unmarried heterosexual 
relationships are immoral and should be discouraged.49  Alternatively, some 
might argue that such relationships are inherently unstable and, therefore, 
detrimental to society.50  Yet, how much can the institution of marriage do to 
strengthen society when 50% of marriages fail in the United States?51 
Administration of a civil union regime should not be too difficult, in light 
of recent experiences.52  Presumably, it would entail the same problems as 
marriage, which, of course, is defined differently in different states and 
 
Marriages Gain Popularity in Iraq, NPR (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=5248949. 
 48. For data on how married couples are treated differently from unmarried couples, see 
Elaine Maag, Taxes and Marriage for Cohabiting Parents, 107 TAX NOTES 1031, 1031 (2005). 
 49. See Dee Ann Habegger, Note, Living in Sin and the Law: Benefits for Unmarried 
Couples Dependent upon Sexual Orientation?, 33 IND. L. REV. 991, 992, 1012 (2000) (outlining 
court cases showing moral disapproval of heterosexual cohabitation without marriage). 
 50. See id. at 1009–10, 1012 (discussing perceptions that extending certain benefits to 
heterosexual cohabiting partners might undermine formal marriage, a societal building block). 
 51. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 2009: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK 818 (128th ed. 2008).  Table 1292 
demonstrates that the United States has a relatively high divorce rate and Japan, Ireland, Italy, and 
Spain have relatively low divorce rates.  Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Frank S. Berall, Tax Consequences of Unmarried Cohabitation, 23 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 395, 395–99 (2004) (detailing civil unions and same-sex marriages in 
Vermont and Massachusetts).   Mozambique’s Personal Income Tax Code allows de facto unions 
to elect to be taxed as a married couple.  Personal Income Tax Code (IRPS) art. 18.1 (Mozam.).  
See also Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-17 (Can.) (detailing the Canadian statutory definition 
of “common law partner”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 23 (2002) (the Vermont Civil Union 
statute).  Australia, France, Iceland, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom also recognize 
unmarried couples for tax purposes.  AULT ET AL., supra note 6, at 320–21 (Australia, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Deconstructing the Taxable Unit: 
Intrahousehold Allocations and the Dilemma of the Joint Return, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 
140, 142 (1999) (France); Ruud Sommerhalder, The Taxation of Families and Individuals in 
Europe, in TAX UNITS AND THE TAX RATE SCALE 163, 166 (John G. Head & Richard Krever 
eds., Austl. Tax Res. Found., Conference Ser. No. 16, 1996) (Netherlands); Kees Waaldikj, Civil 
Developments: Patterns of Reform in the Legal Position of Same-Sex Partners in Europe, 17 
CAN. J. FAM. L. 62, 85 (2000) (noting Iceland recognizes heterosexual, but not homosexual, de 
facto unions). 
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countries.53 Accordingly, considering both general and administrative 
concerns, the case for separate treatment of married couples is neither better 
nor worse than the case for separate treatment of unmarried heterosexual 
couples. 
2. Homosexual Relationships 
Those who favor traditional marriage as a bulwark of society would 
oppose tax advantages for homosexual marriage.  Also, there are those who 
oppose homosexual marriage on moral, religious, and legal grounds.54  
However, in certain situations, homosexual couples are tax-favored over 
heterosexual couples.  For example, in the United States, homosexual couples 
avoid tax penalties that they otherwise would incur if legally married.55 
Children, however, are another matter.  The relevance of children and 
population policy will be addressed in their own right below.  However, 
assuming that encouraging children is a legitimate interest of the state, one 
might argue that benefiting heterosexual relationships encourages children, 
while benefiting homosexual relationships does not. 
 
 53. For an example of the difficulties of determining the tax consequences of the creation 
and dissolution of unmarried cohabitation, see Reynolds v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1479, 
1483 (1999). 
 54. There is a rich literature on tax issues related to homosexual couples, especially relating 
to the Defense of Marriage Act in the United States.  See generally James Alm et al., Wedding 
Bell Blues: The Income Tax Consequences of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 
201 (2000) (arguing that legalizing same-sex marriage would lead to a revenue increase through 
income taxation); Patricia A. Cain, Dependency, Taxes, and Alternative Families, 5 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 267 (2002) (examining how law is biased against dependent children in non-
traditional families); Patricia A. Cain, Relitigating Seaborn: Taxing the Community Income of 
California Registered Domestic Partners, 111 TAX NOTES 561 (2006) (considering how 
community earnings rulings should be applied to same-sex domestic partners); Patricia A. Cain, 
Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805 (2008) (discussing eliminating 
discrepancies in how “family” is defined in different tax jurisdictions);  Patricia A. Cain, 
Unmarried Couples and the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 123 TAX NOTES 473 (2009) 
(discussing limitations on the mortgage interest deduction for unmarried couples); Anthony C. 
Infanti, Prying Open the Closet Door: The U.S. Defense of Marriage Act and Tax Treaties, 36 
TAX NOTES INT’L 765 (2004) (exploring whether a same-sex couple could file a joint return 
internationally, despite the inability to do so in the United States); William Kratzke, The Defense 
of Marriage Act (DOMA) is Bad Income Tax Policy, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 399 (2005) (arguing 
that the Internal Revenue Code should not be interpreted in line with the Defense of Marriage 
Act); Henry Ordower, supra note 6 (comparing how same-sex couples are taxed in various 
countries); Dennis J. Ventry Jr., No Income Splitting for Domestic Partners: How the IRS Erred, 
110 TAX NOTES 1221 (2006) (arguing that the IRS’s decision not to allow domestic partners to 
split income for tax purposes was incorrect). 
 55. In the United States, there are homosexual couples where each partner earns more or less 
half of the household income.  In many cases, these couples pay less aggregate tax than they 
would if they were allowed to marry.  See Alm et al., supra note 54, at 212–13. 
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This position can be attacked as well.  Homosexual couples can, and do, 
adopt.56  Moreover, it seems unlikely that homosexual parents are less capable 
parents, or manage less stable households, than heterosexual couples.57  
However, there are those who believe that heterosexual couples, married or 
unmarried, make better parents.58 
Whether or not homosexual relationships should be recognized, and 
possibly tax-favored, depends upon a number of factors.  First, the income 
pooling and expense sharing is probably no different than in heterosexual 
relationships.  Second, one would have to sort out one’s views on homosexual 
relationships on non-tax grounds.  Finally, at this time, administration in most 
jurisdictions would be problematic.  However, if the country or state were 
willing to provide a statutory definition for recognized homosexual 
relationships, they would be no more difficult to administer than heterosexual 
relationships. 
3. What’s Love Got to Do With It? 
So far, the couples considered have all, presumably, enjoyed some sort of 
romantic attachment.  What about couples (and, presumably, larger groups) 
who are together for reasons other than affection?  What about two roommates, 
of whatever gender, who share an apartment and other expenses because 
neither one alone could afford Manhattan rentals?  What about a niece who 
lives with and cares for her disabled aunt?  A Canadian report proposed that, if 
romantically intertwined groups are to be recognized by the government, then 
non-romantic groups should be recognized as well.59  Once again, as one strays 
 
 56. “We estimate that approximately 65,500 adopted children are being raised by lesbian or 
gay parents, accounting for more than four percent of all adopted children in the United States.”  
GARY J. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 7 (2007), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411437_Adoption_ 
Foster_Care.pdf. 
 57. See Jeffrey G. Gibson, Lesbian and Gay Prospective Adoptive Parents: The Legal Battle, 
HUM. RTS., Spring 1999, at 7, 8 (outlining social science research showing heterosexual and 
homosexual parents do an equally good job). 
 58. One might also argue that couples of whatever gender, married or unmarried, are better 
at child-rearing than are single parents.  However, “the effects of single-parent family status on 
children’s well-being is not fully conclusive.”  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DOING 
BETTER FOR CHILDREN 141 (2009). 
 59. LAW COMM’N OF CAN. BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE 
PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 6–7 (2001).  See also Neil Brooks, The Irrelevance of 
Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability, in TAX UNITS AND THE TAX RATE SCALE, 
supra note 52, at 35, 36, 39 (suggesting that the individual should be the base unit for taxation, 
and other relationships should be irrelevant); Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-
Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509, 1543–44, 1549, 1558–59 (2006) (proposing that 
couples legally committed to sharing their income, regardless of marital status, be permitted to 
file jointly); Lisa Philipps, Comment, Cracking the Conjugal Myths: What Does it Mean for the 
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further from traditional family groupings, difficulties of documenting the 
living arrangements multiply.  And yet, the pooling of income and sharing of 
expenses might well be identical. 
4. Larger Groups 
Should larger groups be recognized?  Recall that simply aggregating the 
taxable income of a larger group of adults, without providing a separate rate 
schedule, would probably result in higher taxes on the group.60  Adding in the 
children, however, is another matter.  Presumably, adding children to the 
taxable mix is usually irrelevant on the income side since children earn 
negligible taxable income.  However, if the medical and other expenses of 
children are added in, certain floors on deductions might be more easily 
achieved.61 
Administration, however, is a problem.  We know what a married couple 
is.  Presumably, we would have little trouble documenting a civil union.  The 
Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), similarly, is probably easy to define, since it 
flows from a long tradition in Hindu law.62  However, when it comes to larger 
entities, such as the nuclear family plus a few in-laws or the hippie commune, 
one does wonder how the groups would be defined and documented, and 
whether society would be comfortable with the invasions of privacy necessary 
to apply the definitions to real-life situations.63 
B. Children 
As a general matter, personal expenditures are nondeductible.64  One’s tax 
bill should not depend upon whether one lives extravagantly or frugally.  
Moreover, if one were to compare two taxpayers with equal personal 
expenditures, it should make no difference in their taxes if one spends her 
money on opera tickets, while the other spends her money on a yacht.  But are 
 
Attribution Rules?, 50 CAN. TAX J. 1031, 1031–32, 1034–35 (2002) (examining the report and 
extrapolating its recommendations).  For further thoughts on the difficulties of defining the 
relevant groups, see Wendy C. Gerzog, Families for Tax Purposes: What about the Steps?, 42 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 805 (2009) (discussing taxation of step-parents and step-children). 
 60. See supra Part I. 
 61. See infra Part II.D. 
 62. The Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) is all persons who are lineal descendants of a 
common ancestor, their wives, and unmarried daughters.  However, to achieve the special tax 
treatments of HUFs under Mitakshara, the property must be owned by the “coparcenary,” which 
is only the male members of the family, who hold property interests due to their birth.  See 
SHUKLENDRA, supra note 13, at 16–26, 30. 
 63. DAVID G. DUFF ET AL., CANADIAN INCOME TAX LAW 25 (2d ed. 2007). 
 64. I.R.C. § 262 (2006). 
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the expenses of supporting children in the same category as opera and 
boating?65 
Somehow, it just doesn’t seem right to categorize child-rearing as just 
another hobby.  Admittedly, there are some who take their hobbies very 
seriously—perhaps even more seriously, than others take their child-rearing 
responsibilities.66  And yet, at the very least, there is the dimension of 
population policy.  If everyone decided not to have children, then assuming no 
immigration, the nation would cease to exist.  No such stakes are at play when 
we decide whether to go sailing or to attend the opera. 
Also, children are citizens, whom the state is obligated to nurture and 
protect.  If their parents do not pay for child care, then the state must pay.67  As 
yet, the state has no similar obligation toward neglected pleasure boats or opera 
houses.  These differences suggest that the state already subsidizes child-
 
 65. I have argued elsewhere that discretionary personal expenses should be nondeductible, 
while nondiscretionary expenses should be deductible.  In this light, the expenses of child-rearing 
are nondiscretionary.  One might argue that, even though child care expenses are nondiscretionary 
once the babies are born, they are the product of an initial personal choice to have children.  
However, one might also argue that the nondiscretionary expenses of treating lung cancer were 
initially caused by the personal decision to smoke, etc.  Therefore, if child care expenses should 
be deemed nondeductible due to the personal choice involved, then so should many medical 
expenses.  See Joel S. Newman, The Deductibility of Nondiscretionary Personal Expenses, 6 AM. 
J. TAX POL’Y 211, 240–42 (1987).  See also Symes v. Canada, 4 S.C.R. 695, ¶ 227 (1993). 
The decision to have children is not like any other ‘consumption’ decision.  To describe 
the raising of children in comparable terms to ‘choosing’ to purchase a certain kind of 
automobile or live in a certain dwelling is simply untenable.  As well, the many 
complexities surrounding child care make it inappropriate to adopt the language of 
voluntary assumption of costs, where those costs may, in fact, be allocated in a 
discriminatory fashion—the burden falling primarily on women. 
Id. (L’Heureux Dube, J., dissenting).  As household income rises, the welfare arguments for tax 
breaks for children subside.  Therefore, I supported the temporary phase-out of the dependency 
exemption for higher incomes in I.R.C. § 151(d)(3), and wished that it had been made permanent. 
 For more background on the changing role of women in the workplace and childcare costs, 
see generally Tsilly Dagan, Ordinary People, Necessary Choices: A Comparative Study of 
Childcare Expenses, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 589 (2010); Audrey Macklin, Comment, 
Symes v. M.N.R.: Where Sex Meets Class, 5 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 498 (1992); Women in the 
Workplace: Female Power, ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 2010, at 49. 
 66. See, e.g., Humanity and Pets Partnered Through the Years Act, H.R. 3501, 111th Cong. 
§ 224 (2009) (proposing a tax deduction for pet care expenses). 
 67. For low-income families, the welfare dimensions of child expenditures are paramount, 
because the government is more likely to step in for these cases.  In contrast, for high-income 
families, the welfare dimension is far less important.  Perhaps it makes sense, then, that in the 
American system, the dependency exemption temporarily phased out for higher incomes.  I.R.C. 
§ 151(d)(3) (2006). 
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rearing far more than other personal lifestyle choices.  Are these subsidies 
sufficient, or should there be tax benefits as well?68 
Population policy should be addressed in its own right.  Most developed 
countries are now facing declining birth rates.69  As a result, there are questions 
as to whether the birth rate is sufficient to keep the population constant.70  
Further, as birth rates decline and life spans are increasing, populations are 
aging, seriously impacting retirement, health care, and other state policy.71  
Depending on one’s perspective, these trends could be good news72 or bad 
news.73 
Population policy has always been deemed a legitimate area for state 
intervention.  To give a few examples, bachelors were penalized in ancient 
Rome.74  In Germany during the Third Reich, mothers with four or more 
children were given Mother’s Honour Crosses—bronze for four children, 
silver for six, and gold for eight or more.75  Holders of the Cross were entitled 
to go to the head of the line in grocery stores and be saluted by Hitler Youth.76  
Hitler personally pinned on the gold cross.77  For mothers who had ten 
children, Hitler himself would be godfather, provided that the tenth child was a 
boy, and the mother named him Adolf.78 
 
 68. An unstated premise of this discussion is that children do better if they come from 
households with more money.  Tax subsidies are one way of providing more money to those 
households.  There is a correlation between household income and child well-being, but it is not 
as strong as some might think.  See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 58, at 31 
(providing a summary of factors that contribute to children’s well-being). 
 69. A Slow-Burning Fuse: Special Report on Aging Population, ECONOMIST, June 27, 2009, 
at 3, 4. 
 70. Go Forth and Multiply a Lot Less, ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 2009, at 29. 
 71. A Slow-Burning Fuse: Special Report on Aging Population, supra note 69, at 3–5. 
 72. See Go Forth and Multiply a Lot Less, supra note 70, at 29–32 (discussing the 
environmental benefits of a declining population). 
 73. See A Slow-Burning Fuse: Special Report on Aging Population, supra note 69, at 3–5.  
Israel has its own population dilemma, as it wishes to replace those who were killed in the 
Holocaust.  Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, No Small Family Gatherings for 99-Year-Old Rabbi, NPR 
(Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113742211.  Sadly, Israel 
is not the only nation with such genocide concerns. 
 Of course, this discussion becomes silly unless it can be shown that government policy, 
and especially fiscal policy, is effective in manipulating the birth rate.  There is some evidence 
that it is indeed effective.  See, e.g., Alma Cohen et al., Do Financial Incentives Affect Fertility? 
(Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 605, 2007), available 
at http://papers.ssrn/com/abstract=1077841. 
 74. 4 DIO’S ROMAN HISTORY 323 (E. Capps et al. eds., Earnest Cary trans., 1917). 
 75. RICHARD J. EVANS, THE THIRD REICH IN POWER: 1933–1939, at 516–17 (2005). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  For a similar, more recent example in Russia, see C.J. Chivers, Putin Urges Plan to 
Reverse Slide in the Birthrate, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at A1 (proposing cash and cover child 
care subsidies on a sliding scale relative to the number of children in a family). 
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Tax incentives and penalties are also common.79  The U.S.S.R. and many 
former Soviet satellite nations enacted bachelor taxes to increase population.80  
Some American territories and states, when they were under-populated, also 
contemplated bachelor taxes.81  Also, the French foyer fiscal, the Hindu 
Undivided family, and even the American dependency exemption can be seen 
as tax devices which encourage large families. 
In terms of personal allowances for children, there is a wide variety of 
approaches.  Some countries give the same allowance per child, no matter how 
many children.82  Some cap the allowances after a certain number of 
children.83  In some countries, the per-child allowances get larger as the 
number of children increases.84  In others, the allowances get smaller.85  In 
Myanmar, the allowance goes up as the child gets older.86  In two countries, 
 
 79. There is a rich literature on children, tax, and fiscal policy, especially in the United 
States.  See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD 
CARE (1997) (examining changes in family structure and earning and their impact on childcare); 
Dorothy Brown, Essay, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (2007) 
(noting that the Senate Finance Committee did not want to increase the earned income tax credit 
for additional children for fear that it would create an “economic incentive for having more [low-
income] children”); Leonard E. Burman & Laura Wheaton, Commentary, Who Gets the Child 
Tax Credit?, 109 TAX NOTES 387 (2005) (presenting statistics on race, gender, and family status 
of who actually receives the child care tax credit); William G. Gale & Laurence K. Kotlikoff, 
Effects of Recent Fiscal Policies on Children, 103 TAX NOTES 1281 (2004) (arguing that tax cuts 
and Medicare prescription drug coverage negatively impact children); C. Garrison Lepow, The 
FlimFlam Father: Deconstructing Parent-Child Stereotypes in Federal Tax Subsidies, 5 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 129 (2001) (examining how custody-based tax incentives fail); Nina E. 
Olson, Uniform Qualifying Child Definition: Uniformity for Most Taxpayers, 111 TAX NOTES 
225 (2006) (arguing that the uniform definition of a qualifying child is an improvement from past 
rules); Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 1121 (2004) (considering whether fertility treatments should be deductible as 
medical expenses). 
 80. Oldman & Temple, supra note 6, at 595–96.  See also Chivers, supra note 78, at A1. 
 81. 1820 Mo. Acts. 1st. Sess. ch. 1, § 1 (providing for a one dollar tax on free white 
bachelors between the ages of 21 and 50).  Indiana attempted to tax bachelors over the age of 25 
in 1907.  Statehouse Quirks, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 19, 1985.  On quite a different theory, 
H.L. Mencken proposed a one dollar a day bachelors’ tax because, he claimed, it was worth at 
least that much to be free.  John C. Chalberg, Book Review, NAT’L REV., Oct. 9, 1987, at 67 
(reviewing MENCKEN AND SARA: A LIFE IN LETTERS (Marion Elizabeth Rodgers ed. 1992)). 
 82. See infra Appendix, Table 8. 
 83. See infra Appendix, Table 9.  Caps on households can perform other functions.  See 
N.Y. CITY, N.Y., HOUSING MAINT. CODE ch. 2, § 27-2075 (1993) (setting maximum permitted 
occupancy rates for city dwellings). 
 84. See infra Appendix, Table 10. 
 85. See infra Appendix, Table 11. 
 86. Income Tax Act § 15A (1974) (Myan.). 
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one gets no tax relief unless one has the requisite number of children.87  
Finally, many countries give no tax relief at all.88 
These various approaches suggest different ways of thinking.  Does each 
additional child have the same marginal cost?  If not, do expenses go up 
disproportionately as the family grows?  Alternatively, are there economies of 
scale, so that costs go down as the number of children goes up?  Do older 
children cost more than younger children?  Surely, older children eat more, but 
younger children require more constant attention.89 
Can government justifiably require that a household have at least a certain 
number of children before granting tax relief?  Perhaps having children below 
the requisite number poses no hardship.  Perhaps alternatively, for population 
policy purposes, having more children should be encouraged.  On the other 
hand, can government justifiably cap the tax relief after a stated number of 
children?  Could they, perhaps, believe that families above a certain size are 
inappropriate or unhealthy? 
Surely, at least some of these concerns, if not all of them, cause 
discomfort.  Why should it be the business of government to inquire so closely 
into the economics of our child-rearing decisions?  Perhaps if we could sort out 
the discomfort, we would be well on the way to a coherent view on what the 
tax policy should be. 
C. Economies of Scale and Imputed Income 
“[W]hile two cannot live as cheaply as one, economies are possible when 
two people share bed and board.”90  It is far more efficient to provide housing 
space for two or more, as compared to a single person.  A quick look at any 
grocery store will prove that food portions are generally designed for 
households of two or more.91  Anyone who has booked a vacation trip can tell 
 
 87. See Internal Revenue Act (Act No. 592/2000) § 39 (Ghana); Tax Code of the Kyrgyz 
Republic art. 76 (1996). 
 88. See infra Appendix, Table 12.  Of course, it is quite possible that these countries grant 
subsidies for children outside of the income tax regime.  In the United Kingdom, for example, 
child allowances were abolished in 1979–1980, when the child benefit scheme was introduced.  
JOHN TILEY, REVENUE LAW 61 (3d ed. 1981). 
 89. For data on the relationship between expenditures for children and the age of the 
children, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 58, at 67.  Would it, perhaps, 
make even more sense to key the children’s allowances to the weight of the children? 
 90. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON TAXATION, supra note 1, at 117.  See also DUFF ET 
AL., supra note 63, at 24 (suggesting that, because of the advantages enjoyed by cohabiting 
couples, they should be taxed more heavily than two cohabiting individuals). 
 91. Okay, so you can save the excess for leftovers, but who wants to?  In my experience, 
some foods, such as lasagna, are better the second night, while others, such as string beans, are 
assuredly not.  The Canadian Royal Commission suggests that there might be diseconomies to 
married couples for low-income groups (who could otherwise live in larger communities) and 
economies of scale for middle-income couples.  REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON TAXATION, 
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you about the premium prices paid if one goes alone.  If the income tax is to be 
based upon ability to pay, then shouldn’t groups be taxed more heavily to 
reflect these advantages?  Arguably, that is what group taxation does. 
Moreover, in some groups, some of the adults do not work outside the 
home.  In such cases, those adults (or older children) typically provide services 
to the household, such as housekeeping and child care.  Typically, there is 
neither money paid nor income taxes levied on the value of this imputed 
income.92  Imagine, for example, Couple AB and single person C.  A works 
outside the home, earning $90,000.  B does not work outside the home, but 
does take care of the house.  C works outside the home and earns $100,000.  
However, C pays a cleaning service $10,000 to take care of the house. 
The cash flow is set forth below: 
 A + B C 
Income $90,000 + $0 = $90,000 $100,000 
Housekeeping expense  – $0 – $10,000 
Net cash flow $90,000  $90,000 
Both Couple AB and single person C have net cash flow of $90,000 and a clean 
house.  Yet, without taxing imputed income, Couple AB will be taxed on 
$90,000, while single person C will be taxed on $100,000.  Given the problems 
with taxing imputed income, can higher taxation of groups be defended as a 
viable substitute?93 
The possible unfairness, however, is not caused by A and B’s decision to 
live together.  Admittedly, that decision probably made it possible for one of 
them to stay at home.  The presence of one of them in the home increased their 
housekeeping options and, perhaps, made those options more pleasant.  
However, C is not without options.  There is nothing to prevent C from doing 
 
supra note 1, at 15–16.  McIntyre and Oldman suggested that the actual arrangements of married 
couples were far too various for any to make blanket assumptions about the presence or absence 
of economies of scale for the entire category.  McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 16, at 1595–96 
n.80. 
 92. The failure to tax the imputed income derived from housework and child care denies the 
dignity and value of the work.  Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1576–77 
(1996).  Also, it can have negative implications on social security benefits.  Id. at 1574.  The 1939 
opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals in Smith v. Comm’r, gives some insight into how little 
respect was given to child care and housework in an earlier generation.  40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), 
aff’d, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 93. See DUFF ET AL., supra note 63, at 28 (discussing ways Canadian law has adapted to 
more accurately tax single-earner couples).  The Canadian Royal Commission rejected this 
approach, arguing that it is inconsistent to tax imputed income only when it is convenient to do 
so.  REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON TAXATION, supra note 1, at 118–19. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] TAXATION OF HOUSEHOLDS 147 
the housework himself or herself.  Presumably, C could stay up later or forego 
other leisure activities.  Similarly, there is nothing to prevent Couple AB from 
hiring out the housework and freeing up B to do something else with his or her 
time.  Seen in this light, it would appear that the possible unfairness arising 
from the failure to tax imputed income from housekeeping services has less to 
do with group living and more to do with various decisions about balancing 
leisure and chores. 
What if the $10,000 expense incurred by single person C was for child care 
instead of housekeeping?94  The numbers would be the same, but the analysis 
is somewhat different.  One can clean the house early in the morning or late at 
night or instead of reading a book.  However, child care is a twenty-four-hour 
responsibility.  One cannot, therefore, blame any unfairness on different 
choices about how to spend leisure time or how many hours to sleep.  
However, here, the issue is raised less by the decision to live in a group and 
more by the decision to have children.  There are, of course, issues on the 
appropriateness of tax subsidies for having children, but they are treated 
separately above.95 
D. Floors and Ceilings 
Tax attributes often phase in and out as a function of income.96  Tax 
attributes targeted to poor people properly phase out as income rises.97  The 
United States’s earned income tax credit, for example, phases out at higher 
incomes.98  But whose income: the individual’s income or the household’s 
income?99  Similarly, medical expenses are only deductible to the extent that 
they exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income.100  Whose adjusted gross income?  
If these tax attributes are designed to reflect ability to pay, then should it be the 
individual’s ability to pay or the household’s ability to pay? 
For purposes of the medical expense deduction threshold, both parents’ 
adjusted gross income is aggregated, if they file a joint return.101  The medical 
expenses themselves are aggregated even further, for they can be the medical 
 
 94. C could adopt.  Alternatively, C could have been previously married. 
 95. See supra Part II.B. 
 96. See, e.g., I.R.C § 32(a) (2006). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based 
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 577 (1995) (discussing the difficulty in determining 
what constitutes the “family” for taxation purposes under current federal tax law).  A number of 
tax systems, including Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, while generally taxing 
individuals, aggregate household income for the purposes of granting personal allowances.  AULT 
ET AL., supra note 6, at 320–21. 
 100. I.R.C. § 213. 
 101. See id. 
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expenses of the parents and the children.102  In allowing the aggregation of 
children’s medical expenses, it is far more likely that a family’s medical 
expenses will exceed the 7.5% than it is for a single person’s medical expenses 
to exceed this threshold.  This fact is a further tax advantage for families.  Can 
it be justified?  Of course it can.  When considering a family’s ability to pay, it 
makes no sense at all to consider the costs of the father’s prostate cancer, but 
not the son’s appendectomy.103 
In fact, there are floors and ceilings throughout the Internal Revenue 
Code.104  Sometimes, they take groups into account, sometimes not.105  There 
does not appear to be any rhyme or reason to this inconsistent tax treatment.106 
E. Intra-Group Transfers 
If the household were a single taxable unit, then payments from one 
household member to another would not be considered.  They would be treated 
as a transfer from one’s left pocket to one’s right.  However, if each member of 
the household were deemed to be a separate taxpayer, then these intra-group 
transfers would have to be accounted for. 
Spouses routinely share their expenses.  Should a payment by one spouse 
of groceries consumed by the other, be taxable to the other?  One would 
assume not.  The United States addresses the problem in part in Section 1041 
of the Internal Revenue Code.  Most of these kinds of payments are considered 
tax-free gifts.107  Any other result would lead to an enormous recordkeeping 
burden—a burden most taxpayers would probably ignore. 
Similarly, parents pay for the food, clothing, and shelter of their minor 
children.  In a world of rigorous taxation of individuals, would these amounts 
be taxable to the children?  One would think not.  Again, such payments, in 
discharge of the parents’ legal obligation, would normally be tax-free gifts.108  
Of course, there could be questions at the margin, with difficult issues of 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. These concerns are relevant if the group is recognized to some extent.  If the group is not 
recognized, then there are different problems with medical expenses, addressed in the next section 
on intra-group transfers. 
 104. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 67 (allowing deductions only if aggregate amount exceeds two percent 
of adjusted gross income); Id. § 223 (limiting deductions for contributions to health savings 
accounts); Id. § 222 (limiting the amount that may be deduction as qualified tuition). 
 105. See, e.g., id. § 223 (limiting deductions for an individual’s contribution to a health 
savings account); Id. § 213 (allowing a deduction for “family” medical expenses that exceed 
seven and one-half percent of adjusted gross income). 
 106. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 16, at 3–5; Robinson & Wenig, supra 
note 47, at 842–47 (illustrating the seemingly arbitrary floors and ceilings throughout the Internal 
Revenue Code). 
 107. I.R.C. § 1041. 
 108. Id. § 2503. 
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valuation and recordkeeping.109  Generally, however, the income side is not a 
problem.110 
What about the deduction side?  When one spouse incurs a deductible 
expense for the benefit of the entire household, who should get the deduction?  
One easy answer is to follow the money.  In the United States, for example, 
when married couples file separate returns, deductions are usually taken by the 
spouse who actually pays the money, even if the liability for the payment was 
joint.111  Charitable contributions of property are taken by whoever owned the 
property, and casualty losses are taken by the spouse whose property was 
damaged.112  But not all countries follow suit.  In Greece, for example, 
deductible home mortgage expenses are apportioned to the spouses on the 
basis of the income earned by each.113  In The Netherlands, the mortgage 
interest deduction goes to whoever is taxed on the rental value of the home.114  
Some have proposed a similar scheme for the United States.115 
Would anyone ever argue that children should receive the deductions for 
medical payments, or even housing payments made on their behalf?  Since the 
income of most children is nominal, such a scheme would be tantamount to 
denying the deduction.  In effect, such a scheme would effectively be a tax 
penalty on having children.116 
F. Incentives to Work 
If a nation taxes individuals, then each one will pay tax on the first dollar 
of income at the lowest marginal rate.117  However, if a nation taxes groups, 
then conceptually, the income of one group member will be taxed first, at the 
 
 109. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON TAXATION, supra note 1, at 225–26. 
 110. The Canadian Royal Commission recommends that all intra-family transactions be 
ignored.  Id. at 279. 
 111. Finney v. Comm’r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504, 1507 (1977); John Allain Viator, Comment, 
What You Earn is Yours, but You are Jointly and Severally Liable for His: A Proportionate 
Liability Proposal for Federal Income Taxes, 58 LA. L. REV. 309, 335 (1997). 
 112. Viator, supra note 111, at 335. 
 113. IBFD, GLOBAL INDIVIDUAL TAX HANDBOOK: 2009 330 (Nick Crowley et al. eds., 
2009). 
 114. AULT ET AL., supra note 6, at 321. 
 115. Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 343–44 
(1994) (recommending taxing income from property to the spouse who owns the property); 
Viator, supra note 111, at 309–10 (proposing and discussing a a proportionate liability system). 
 116. These questions do not merely impact on the allocation of the deductions per se; they 
would also have an impact on the various floors and ceilings that might apply to the deductions.  
See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 117. Margaret Ryznar, To Work, or Not to Work? The Immortal Tax Disincentives for 
Married Women, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 921, 926–27 (2009). 
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lowest marginal rate.118  Then, the income of subsequent group members will 
be piled on top and taxed at higher marginal rates.119 
When a couple marries, will the man’s income be taxed first, at a lower 
rate, and will the woman’s income be piled on top and taxed at a higher rate?  
This argument is silly: It makes just as much sense that the woman’s income is 
taxed first, and the man’s income is taxed second.  At least, this argument is 
silly if one imagines the case of a man and woman, both working outside the 
home, who decide to get married.  Surely, neither one’s income is taxed first or 
second. 
If, however, one considers an alternative scenario, the argument might 
make sense.  Consider a married couple with one spouse working outside the 
home and the other not.  Assume that the spouse who is not working outside 
the home decides to enter the labor market.  From the perspective of this 
spouse, his or her new income will be piled on top of the income previously 
earned by the other spouse.  For such a couple, therefore, the aggregation of 
incomes in group taxation does function as a disincentive to the second spouse 
entering the labor market outside the home.120 
In the traditional family, if only one spouse is working outside the home, 
that spouse is the man.121  First, even if both spouses entered the marriage 
gainfully employed outside the home, when the children come, the woman is 
far more likely to give up her job to stay home and care for them.122  Second, if 
one spouse leaves the labor market, it is likely to be the woman because she is 
likely to earn less than the man.123  Therefore, it will be the woman whose later 
decision to enter or reenter the labor market will be penalized.124  For this 
reason, among others, the traditional feminist position has been for individual, 
and not group, taxation.125 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  Some have argued unsuccessfully that the marriage penalty which results from the 
aggregation of incomes violates the constitution.  See Richard L. Elbert, Comment, Love, God, 
and Country: Religious Freedom and the Marriage Penalty Tax, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 
1171, 1172–73 n.7 (1995). 
 120. See Ryznar, supra note 117, at 926 (noting that the tax disincentive is one factor a 
married woman will consider before seeking employment). 
 121. See Grace Blumberg, supra note 6, at 49 (observing that American working wives are 
predominantly the secondary family earners). 
 122. Id. at 89–90. 
 123. Id. at 49, 89. 
 124. Laura Ann Davis, Note, A Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing 
System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197, 210–11 (1988). 
 125. See Blumberg, supra note 6, at 95 (recommending the implementation of individual 
taxation in order to make the Internal Revenue Code consistent with the principle of sexual 
equality); Davis, supra note 124, at 199 (providing a feminist justification for individual filing); 
Miranda Stewart, Gender Equity in Australia’s Tax System 19 (Melbourne Law Sch. Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 443, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520795 (“[A]n 
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Does aggregation of incomes truly deter the second spouse from entering 
the labor market?  There is some evidence that it does.  In a 1997 study, the 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that second spouses would work from 
4–7% less than they would in a regime of individual taxation.126  If so, then 
this aspect of the taxable aggregation of income creates both fairness and 
efficiency concerns. 
G. Control versus Benefit 
Some have argued, as a theoretical matter, that one should determine at the 
outset whether it is more important who controls the income or who benefits 
from the income.127  Generally speaking, focusing on control is likely to lead to 
individual taxation, for income is more often than not controlled by the one 
who earns it.128  On the other hand, focusing on benefit is more likely to lead to 
group taxation and reallocation of income from those who earn it, to those who 
use it.129  The American approach to assignment of income would probably 
resemble the control approach.130  Also, notions of control fit more 
comfortably with an income tax base, while notions of benefit fit better with a 
 
approach which takes seriously the capabilities of women provides strong support for a 
progressive individual income tax . . . .”).  Cf. Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: 
Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2005 (1996) (noting the 
standard feminist preference is for individual filing, but is somewhat weak). 
 126. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 16, at 12.  See also Siv Gustafsson, Separate 
Taxation and Married Women’s Labor Supply: A Comparison of West Germany and Sweden, 5 J. 
POPULATION ECON. 61, 62, 77 (1992) (noting that the percentage of married women in the 
workforce in Sweden, which switched to individual taxation, far exceeds the percentage of such 
women in the workforce in Germany, which taxes jointly); Zelenak, supra note 115, at 372–73 
(describing how joint returns discourage women from entering the workforce). 
 127. DUFF ET AL., supra note 63, at 24–25. 
 128. Id. at 24–25. 
 129. Id. at 24. 
 130. In Lucas v. Earl, the Supreme Court rejected a test based upon income “beneficially 
received.”  281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930).  The famous fruit and tree analogy is a test based upon 
control, not benefit.  In Geiger v. Comm’r, the taxpayer was an embezzler who diverted the 
embezzled funds to other objects of her bounty.  352 F.2d 221, 223 (8th Cir. 1965).  She claimed 
that those objects of her bounty should have been taxed on the income.  Id.  Judge Blackmun 
wrote: 
The taxpayers’ position in effect is that, technically, these funds flowed direct from the 
bank to the outside beneficiaries and did not pass through Geiger hands.  That may be one 
way to describe it.  Another, equally valid, is that the funds came to Mrs. Geiger and were 
passed out or made available by her to the beneficiaries.  These beneficiaries were the 
objects of her bounty, not the bank’s.  She was the force and the fulcrum which made 
those benefits possible.  She assumed unto herself actual command over the funds.  This 
is enough. 
Id. at 231 (citing Corliss v. Bowees, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930)). 
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consumption tax base.131  However, given the paramount importance of ability 
to pay to a discussion of households, perhaps, benefit and not control should be 
more important. 
CONCLUSION 
Taxing households any way you can think of—and some that you could 
not possibly have thought of—is being done or has been done, by some 
country, somewhere.  Special circumstances of particular countries explain 
their taxation choices.  Some countries have more serious population problems 
than others.  Some countries have longstanding traditions of polygamy and 
communal living; some do not.  Some countries in the developing world have 
difficulties with detailed recordkeeping requirements; some do not.  Nation-
states, however, are far too complex for any easy determinations of why a 
particular choice was made, or whether or not it has worked out as intended. 
Many of the factors described here can cancel each other out.132  For 
example, one might establish a regime of group taxation, with reallocation of 
income within the group, in order to encourage larger families.  However, that 
regime would be unfair to single taxpayers and might deter the second spouse 
from entering the workforce.  On the other hand, taxing married couples more 
heavily to recognize their economies of scale and untaxed imputed income, 
discourages marriage.  Pick your poison. 
Moreover, it is not necessary to change the entire structure of the taxation 
system, in order to achieve some of the goals described here.  For example, if 
one wanted to encourage group living arrangements, one could devise a system 
of tax credits or allowances for children or other dependents, or even narrower 
tax allowances for the expenses of caring for group members, without 
departing from an individual taxation scheme.  What is more, most of these 
goals could be achieved by means totally extraneous to the tax laws, by 
welfare subsidies or tuition vouchers.  Such non-tax mechanisms would be a 
far more effective, fair, and transparent way to address population policy 
concerns.133 
No structural solution will satisfy everyone, or even achieve fairness.  
Some goals even cancel out other goals.  Accordingly, given the absence of a 
clear best-case, one-size-fits-all solution, the structural choice should be the 
simplest choice.  The taxpayer should be the individual, period, and there 
should be only one rate. 
 
 131. Ault suggests that the French foyer fiscal can be justified by an emphasis on 
consumption (benefit) over control.  AULT ET AL., supra note 6, at 322. 
 132. See id. at 317–18. 
 133. France offers paid leave of up to €1,000 per month to women who have a third child.  
Katha Pollitt, Europeans Do It Better, THE NATION, Apr. 2, 2007, at 10. 
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Taxation should be about money, not relationships.  Either all pooling of 
income and expenses should be recognized for tax purposes, or none.  
Recognizing none is far simpler. 
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APPENDIX 
The following tables provide non-exhaustive lists of countries categorized 
by particular attributes of the way they tax families.  Paragraph and page 
citations are from IBFD, IBFD GLOBAL INDIVIDUAL TAX HANDBOOK 2009.  
Ault citations are to the page number in HUGH J. AULT ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2010). 
Table 3 
COUNTRIES/REGIMES WHICH TAX INDIVIDUALS ONLY 
IBFD ¶ IBFD Page 
Algeria ¶1.10.2 p. 16 
Australia Ault p. 320 
Austria ¶1.1  p. 37 
Barbados ¶1.1 p. 51 
Belarus ¶1.1 p. 59 
Bolivia ¶1.1 p. 73 
Canada ¶1.1 p. 93 
 Ault p. 320 
Colombia ¶1.1 p. 117 
Croatia ¶1.1 p. 129 
Egypt ¶1.1.1 p. 171 
Finland ¶1.1 p. 189 
Japan ¶1.1 p. 331 
 Ault p. 321 
Lebanon ¶1.1 p. 363 
Moldova ¶1.1 p. 437 
Montenegro ¶1.1 p. 447 
Netherlands ¶1.1 p. 459 
Nicaragua ¶1.1 p. 473 
Russia ¶1.1 p. 547 
Singapore ¶1.1 p. 559 
Slovenia ¶1.1 p. 571 
South Korea ¶1.1 p. 349 
Sweden ¶1.1 p. 597 
 Ault p. 321 
Turkey ¶1.1 p. 655 
Ukraine ¶1.1 p. 663 
United Kingdom ¶1.1 p. 669 
 Ault p. 321 
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Table 4 
COUNTRIES WHICH TAX INDIVIDUALS ON EARNED INCOME,  
BUT TAX OTHER INCOME DIFFERENTLY 
A. Earned Income Taxed to Individuals; Community Property Income Taxed 
50% to Each Spouse 
Ecuador ¶1.1 p. 165 
Italy ¶1.1 p. 323 
Mauritius ¶1.1 p. 423 
[“income derived jointly”] 
Paraguay ¶1.1 p. 505 
Peru ¶1.1 p. 509 
South Africa ¶1.10.2 p. 581 
B. Earned Income Taxed to Individuals; Other Income Taxed to Husband 
Argentina ¶1.1 p. 21 
Chile ¶1.1 p. 103 
C. Earned Income Taxed to Individuals; Other Income Taxed to Higher 
Earning Spouse 
Belgium ¶1.1 p. 63 
Iceland ¶1.1 p. 281 
 
Table 5 
COUNTRIES WHICH AGGREGATE HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
Liechtenstein ¶1.1 p. 375 
Luxembourg ¶1.1 p. 391 
Malta ¶1.1 p. 417 
Switzerland ¶1.1 p. 605 
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Table 6 
COUNTRIES WHICH AGGREGATE HOUSEHOLD INCOME, BUT TAX AS IF A 
PERCENTAGE WAS DEEMED EARNED BY VARIOUS FAMILY MEMBERS 
[Not Necessarily Mandatory] 
Estonia ¶1.1 p. 183 
France See description of foyer fiscal, supra 
 notes 29–41 and accompanying text 
Germany ¶1.1 p. 221 
Ireland ¶1.10.2 p. 305 
Portugal ¶1.1 p. 531 
Table 7 
COUNTRIES WHICH ALLOW MARRIED TAXPAYERS TO  
ELECT EITHER AGGREGATE OR SEPARATE 
Brazil ¶1.1 p. 61 
Estonia ¶1.1 p. 183 
Germany ¶1.1 p. 221 
 Ault  p. 319 
Guernsey ¶1.2.1 p. 254 
Hong Kong ¶1.1 p. 263 
Indonesia ¶1.1 p. 293 
Ireland ¶1.1 p. 299 
Malaysia ¶1.1 p. 411 
Norway ¶1.1 p. 483 
Panama ¶1.1 p. 499 
Poland ¶1.1 p. 523 
 [spouses in a community property 
 marriage may elect an aggregate return] 
Spain ¶1.10.2 p. 591 
Thailand ¶1.1 p. 641 
Uruguay ¶1.1 p. 695 
Venezuela ¶1.1 p. 701 
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Table 8 
COUNTRIES WHICH GIVE ALLOWANCES FOR EACH CHILD, 
NO MATTER HOW MANY CHILDREN 
Austria ¶1.7.3 p. 39 
Belarus ¶1.7.2 p. 60 
Brazil ¶1.7 p. 81 
Czech Republic ¶1.7.3 p. 44 
Germany ¶1.7.2 p. 226 
Israel ¶1.7.2 p. 319 
Japan ¶1.7.2 p. 334 
Latvia ¶1.7.2 p. 359 
Liechtenstein ¶1.7.2 p. 377 
Lithuania ¶1.7.2 p. 386 
Malaysia ¶1.7.2 p. 413 
Moldova ¶1.7.2 p. 439 
Panama ¶1.7 p. 500–01 
Portugal ¶1.7.3.1 p. 535 
Romania ¶1.7.2 p. 543 
 [but capped at a monetary amount] 
Singapore ¶1.7.3 p. 561 
Slovak Republic ¶1.7.3 p. 567 
Slovenia ¶1.7.2 p. 573 
Switzerland ¶1.7.2 p. 607 
Venezuela ¶1.7.2 p. 702–03 
Table 9 
COUNTRIES WHICH CAP ALLOWANCES FOR CHILDREN, AFTER A STATED 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
1 Child 
Gibraltar ¶1.7.2 p. 234 
2 Children 
Barbados ¶1.7.2 p. 53 
3 Children  
Indonesia ¶1.7.3 p. 294 
Mauritius ¶1.7.1 p. 424–25 
Thailand ¶1.7.2 p. 641 
4 Children 
Nigeria ¶1.7.2 p. 479 
Philippines ¶1.7.2 p. 517 
9 Children 
Hong Kong ¶1.7.2 p. 265 
11 Children 
Croatia ¶1.7.2 p. 131 
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Table 10 
COUNTRIES IN WHICH THE PER CHILD ALLOWANCES INCREASE  
AS THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN INCREASES 
Belgium ¶1.7.2.2 p. 65 
Croatia ¶1.7.2 p. 131 
Lithuania ¶1.7.2 p. 386 
Singapore ¶1.7.3 p. 561 
Slovenia ¶1.7.2 p. 573 
Spain ¶1.7.2 p. 590 
Table 11 
COUNTRIES IN WHICH THE PER CHILD ALLOWANCES DECREASE  
AS THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN INCREASES 
Tunisia ¶1.7.2 p. 649 
Table 12 
COUNTRIES WHICH GRANT NO TAX ALLOWANCES FOR CHILDREN 
Australia ¶1.7.2 p. 31 
Chile ¶1.72 p. 106 
Costa Rica ¶1.7.1–2 p. 124 
Cyprus ¶1.7.2 p. 136 
Greece ¶1.7.2 p. 241 
Honduras ¶1.6.2 p. 260 
Hungary ¶1.7.2 p. 275 
Iceland ¶1.7.2 p. 282 
India ¶1.7.2 p. 289 
Malta ¶1.7.2 p. 419 
Montenegro ¶1.7.2 p. 448 
Netherlands ¶1.7.2 p. 462 
New Zealand ¶1.7.2 p. 468 
Nicaragua ¶1.7 p. 474 
Peru ¶1.7 p. 511 
Turkey ¶1.7.2 p. 658 
